In this work, we consider the problem of key cloning in attribute-based encryption schemes. We introduce a new type of attribute-based encryption scheme, called token-based attribute-based encryption (tk-ABE) that provides strong deterrence for key cloning, in the sense that delegation of keys reveals some personal information about the user. It also has the feature that a misbehaving user can be easily revoked. We formalise the security requirements for such a scheme in terms of indistinguishability of the ciphertexts and two new security requirements which we call uncloneability and privacy-preserving. We construct a privacy-preserving uncloneable token-based attribute-based encryption scheme based on Cheung and Newport's ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme and prove the scheme satisfies the above three security requirements. We also introduce the notion of non-interactive uncloneable attribute-based encryption in order to remove the online token server in the tk-ABE. We then construct such a new scheme with provable security. It should be pointed out that, although our non-interactive scheme is token-free, the scheme does not have the capability to easily revoke users from the scheme. Hence, both types of schemes have their own merits of existence.
Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes provide an elegant way of encrypting messages such that users satisfying an access control policy can decrypt the ciphertext. In an ABE scheme, users' private keys are issued by a trusted authority which assigns privileges to the users to access encrypted content and hence allows the system to be a powerful and efficient approach to controlling users' access. There are two flavours for ABE schemes. In a ciphertext-policy (CP-ABE) scheme, a message is encrypted with a specific access policy determined by the encryptor. For example, when a CP-ABE scheme is used to control access to messages in a bulletin board of a company, the encryptor can specify that the message may only be decrypted by 'technical staff in Department A'. In a CP-ABE scheme, the users' keys, issued by the trusted authority, reflect their attributes and define their access rights. A user whose attributes matches the decryption policy associated with a ciphertext can decrypt that ciphertext. A second flavour of ABE systems are key-policy (KP-ABE) schemes. Here, users' keys (issued by the systems trusted authority) capture an access structure (policy) while ciphertexts are associated with attribute sets; again decryption requires that the users' policy 'match' the attribute set of the ciphertext. In both types of ABE systems, the encryption system can be seen as a secure method of enforcing access control policy.
Linking access rights to users' private keys means that if a user gives away their private key, then the system's access control policy is breached. This is because private keys issued to users reflect the users' privileges. This is very different from users leaking their private keys in a traditional public key encryption (PKE) system. In these latter types of systems, a user's private key is chosen by the user and does not reflect any access control policy of the system. Here, users are wary of giving away their private keys because this will give away their personal information. The reluctance of users to expose such information makes the problem of 'giving away' private keys not very critical in a PKE scheme, while in ABE scheme this presents a serious threat and security breach. A similar problem exists in broadcast encryption systems where a ciphertext can be decrypted by a specified subgroup of users. The issue of sharing keys in such systems is addressed by introducing a mechanism such as decoder fingerprinting and traitor tracing (see Blakley et al., 1986; Chor et al., 1994) .
In all known ABE schemes users can give away their private keys (referred to as key cloning). There are many examples in which key cloning undermines the intended purpose of the encryption scheme and thus providing protection against it is an important issue. For example, Staddon et al. (2008) present an ABE scheme for document redaction. Here, parts of a document are 'blacked-out' by encrypting them with the ABE scheme. Only users with attributes satisfying the decryption policy of the redacted document are then able to decrypt these blacked-out regions and fully read the document. For instance, legal documents might black-out the names of minors in a report. The decryption policy might specify that only law enforcement personnel, judges, or high ranking politicians are able to decrypt this information. If a decryption key is leaked to the press in such a scenario, the privacy of the minors in the document is violated and perhaps local laws too. Another suggested use for ABE schemes, by Bethencourt et al. (2007) , is for encryption of documents by the FBI. In such a scheme, FBI agents encrypt memos so that only people that have certain credentials are able to access it. Since there is no recourse for delegating keys in the scheme, a low paid agent might be tempted to sell their decryption key to the press or a private investigator. In both of these examples, ABE provides an elegant solution to a specific access control problem. However, these examples are 'secure' if we assume that no users clone their private keys.
We note that in existing ABE systems there are other ways that malicious users can misuse their keys. For example, they can construct pseudo-keys: a private key constructed by a user A such that, although it looks different from A's own private key, it allows the holder of the pseudo-key to decrypt messages that A can decrypt (or possibly only a subset of the ciphertexts that A can decrypt). It is also possible for users A and B to collude with each other to construct new keys that can decrypt all (or some) of the ciphertexts that both A and B can decrypt. Even in ABE systems in which key delegation is a feature, for example, in Bethencourt et al. (2007) , there is no mechanism to revoke the delegated keys or any constraints on who can issue delegated keys. In all of these scenarios, one or more users of the system can, effectively, issue access rights to another entity by giving them a key that can decrypt some ciphertexts: a role that in a secure implementation of the system is designated only to the system trusted authority.
The aim of this work is to address uncloneability of keys and can be seen as a first step towards the more general problem of protection against key misuse in ABE schemes. In this work, we only consider CP-ABE schemes although our ideas and approaches can easily be extended to KP-ABE schemes.
Our contributions
The discussion above motivates us to consider a new security property for ABE schemes, called uncloneability, to capture the protection of an ABE system against users who are misusing their access rights (decryption privileges) by cloning their keys for other entities.
To achieve this security property, we introduce a new type of ABE system called token-based attribute-based encryption (tk-ABE) that provides a strong disincentive, or deterrence, for users to misuse their privileges. The intuition is that ABE private keys are impersonal keys and related to users' attributes that are group properties. So users would be willing to share them with their 'friends' or other entities given sufficient incentives. However, if the keys are personalised and can be directly linked to a user's 'personal information', such as a credit card number, for example, there will be a strong incentive for users not to share them. Thus, we use the concept of self-policing (with penalty of personal information exposure) to prevent key delegation. We note that without assuming trusted hardware it is always possible for users to make clones of their private keys and so a protection mechanism against key delegation will always be in the form of a deterrent rather than a strictly preventative method.
Model
A tk-ABE scheme consists of three types of entities: a trusted key generator (TKG), a token server (TS), and users. The TKG is a trusted entity that stores the system master key MK and generates users' private keys based on the access control policy of the organisation. The TKG also uses some user-specific personal information, such as a credit card number, to create token information for each user which is then securely sent to the TS, which maintains a database of users in the system (along with each users' token information). Users will only be enrolled in the system by presenting their personal information at the time of key issuance. The system guarantees that this personal information will never be revealed, learnt or misused even if the TS is corrupted. This personal information, however, will become accessible to anyone in possession of the users' private key (i.e., the user and any other entity that the user shares its private key with).
This privacy guarantee is very strong and ensures that each user's privacy (with respect to their personal information provided) remains intact as long as the user does not misuse their privileges and provided they can trust TKG at the time of entering the system. In a real-life implementation, the key issuing process can be a trusted process including trusted hardware implementing the private key derivation algorithm.
Any entity with the system public key PK can encrypt a plaintext message M with some decryption policy W that is allowable by the scheme. The resulting ciphertext C includes a ciphertext coupon ˆ.
C A user who wants to decrypt C presents the ciphertext coupon Ĉ to the TS and receives a decryption token T that is computed (by the TS) using Ĉ and the token information for that user. This token can only be used for decryption by a user whose attributes satisfy the decryption policy of C, and does not pose a security threat if captured by an adversary. The plaintext can be recovered provided that the user has a private key corresponding to attributes that satisfy the decryption policy for C and the decryption token T.
A tk-ABE scheme has the advantage that once a misbehaving user is identified, the system can easily revoke the user by removing its token information stored by the token server. Since any ciphertext satisfying the user's attribute set can only be decrypted with the help of the token server, removing its token information effectively removes the user from the system.
Security properties
There are three desired security properties for tk-ABE schemes: ciphertext indistinguishability, uncloneability and privacy-preserving.
Ciphertext indistinguishability is defined as a game between a challenger and an adversary similar to the security games in typical ABE schemes, except that oracle access to TS must also be included. It should be noted that the ciphertext indistinguishability also implies collusion resistance. That is, two (or more) users in the system cannot work together using their private keys to decrypt any ciphertext that any of the individual users could not have decrypted alone.
A tk-ABE scheme is said to be uncloneable if any user giving a clone of their private key will enable the receiver of the cloned information to compute that user's personal information.
The privacy-preserving property of a tk-ABE scheme requires that a user's personal information remains private even if the TS is corrupted.We say that a scheme that satisfies this property is privacy-preserving.
Constructions
We give a construction of an uncloneable privacypreserving tk-ABE scheme that uses the ciphertext-policy ABE scheme by Cheung and Newport (2007) (referred to as the CN scheme in the sequel) as the base scheme. That is, we convert the CN scheme into a tk-ABE scheme, by showing how to modify the encryption and decryption algorithms to generate ciphertext coupons and decrypt using the ciphertext and a decryption token associated with that ciphertext and a specific user with a set of attributes satisfying the decryption policy. We prove the security properties of the scheme in standard model. The ideas and methods of this construction can be used to convert other known CP-ABE schemes (e.g., Ostrovsky et al., 2007) and key-policy ABE schemes (e.g., Goyal et al., 2006; Staddon et al., 2008) . Indeed, we provide a second tk-ABE scheme based on the CP-ABE scheme of Bethencourt et al. (2007) , in the Section 6.
Non-interactive systems
Decryption in tk-ABE schemes requires interaction between users and the token server. This has the drawback of requiring the token server to be online. In Section 7, we discuss non-interactive uncloneable ABE schemes and present a construction of a non-interactive scheme that provides protection against uncloneability. While a non-interactive uncloneable ABE scheme has the benefit of no longer requiring an online token server, it lacks the simple and efficient user revocation that the interactive online schemes possess. Thus, each approach has its own merits of existence.
Future work
Key misuse can pose a severe security risk to real-life implementations of ABE schemes. Our approach to introduce a token server breaks the decryption process into a two step process and requires interaction with a token server. The trust requirement on this server is minimal in the sense that the server neither has decryption power nor can extract users' personal information. In addition to introducing a deterrence for key delegation, the use of a token server provides a simple mechanism to revoke users: the TKG can simply inform the TS to remove a user's entry from the database.
It is interesting to consider alternative approaches to enforce non-delegatability, such as traceability of users who clone their keys.
Outline for rest of paper
Related work is briefly discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, we review the main properties of ABE schemes and in Section 4 we formalise our new type of ABE scheme, token-based ABE schemes. Constructions of tk-ABE schemes are given in Sections 5 and 6. In Section 7, we discuss non-interactive schemes and present a construction of such a scheme. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude with a discussion of this and future work.
Related work
Two recent PhD theses dealing with several security issues related to ABE schemes are by Chow (2010) and Yu (2010) .
Attribute-based encryption
The current notion of ABE was introduced by Sahai and Waters in 2005 . The first concrete CP-ABE was proposed by Nali et al. (2005) . The decryption policies in Nali et al.'s scheme consist of the conjunction of threshold gates, where the number of gates and the threshold of each are determined at encryption time. Later, Bethencourt et al. (2007) extended Sahai and Waters' scheme to construct a CP-ABE scheme in which decryption policies are described by threshold trees. Here, each node in the tree corresponds to a threshold gate and each leaf corresponds to an attribute. If a user's attributes satisfies the tree, then they can decrypt the ciphertext. Another CP-ABE scheme was proposed by Cheung and Newport (2007) , in which decryption policies are restricted to a single AND gate, but attributes are allowed to be either positive or negative. This scheme is easily extended to allow for decryption policies consisting of a disjunction of AND gates by simply encrypting the plaintext once for each AND.
Many other ABE schemes have been proposed which extend upon the functionality of Sahai and Waters' original scheme: Baek et al. (2007) , Bethencourt et al. (2007) , Cheung and Newport (2007) , Goyal et al. (2006 Goyal et al. ( , 2008 , Liang et al. (2009b) , Nali et al. (2005) , Ostrovsky et al. (2007) , Staddon et al. (2008) and Waters (2008) . The use of multi-authorities has been considered by Chase (2007) and Lin et al. (2008) . Efficient key revocation is considered by Lin et al. (2008) . Generalisations of the basic two flavours of ABE (CP and KP) are considered by Imai (2009a, 2009b) , Boneh and Hamburg (2008) , Katz et al. (2008) and Liang et al. (2009a) . Wang et al. (2008) consider the security problems of key delegation in access control systems. Key cloning, which is the focus of our work, is a special case of key delegation, in which the entire key is delegated.
Security issues of key delegation

ABE and traitor tracing
The problem of key cloning in ABE schemes has also been considered by , Yu et al. (2009) and Wang et al. (2011) . Here, the authors use traitor tracing to reveal ownership of a valid decrypting key as a means to thwart key cloning. However, this entails that the decryption algorithm/decryption key be considered as a black box that can be made available (or obtained in some way) in order to determine initial ownership of the key, which may be an unrealistic requirement in some scenarios. Our scheme is an alternative approach to preventing key cloning.
Traitor tracing in the multi-authority ABE setting is considered by Li et al. (2011) . Earlier work addressing privacy concerns with multi-authority ABE schemes was done by Chase and Chow (2009), and Chow (2010) .
Non-delegatability
The security property of non-delegatability was first proposed and formalised by Lipmaa et al. (2005) , as a requirement for designated-verifier signatures. Our definition of uncloneability has a similar essence to theirs, in the sense that in both, the ability to generate certain output implies knowledge of a secret. In our case, the certain output is the decrypted message (plaintext) and the secret is the user's sensitive personal info embedded into the system. Closer to our work is digital signets from Dwork et al. (1996) , which applies to broadcast encryption (and is the motivation for our use of tokens and a token server). Here, a user must receive a digital signet, which is a function of that user's private information, from an authorisation centre in order to access the content of the broadcast. A user is bound to decryption via their personal information and the digital signets. Sharing the (restricted) content with other users (who should not have access to this content) entails revealing the user's private information or simply sharing the content. The scenario here is different from ours in two ways: first, the binding in Dwork et al.'s scheme needs to be small in size and communication capacities (bandwidth) are assumed to be restricted; second, our scheme is an ABE scheme, which is similar to broadcast encryption schemes but not the same. However, this work can be seen as an extension of the general ideas of digital signets to ABE schemes. Fiat and Naor (1994) laid the foundations of broadcast encryption. These schemes are used to encrypt broadcast content in a way that only a privileged subset of users can decrypt the content. Key misuse problem is addressed by assuming tamper-resistant hardware or provisions to trace 'traitors' who share their key information. In particular, key cloning is protected by tamper resistant hardware. Assuming tamper resistant hardware for storing keys provides security against key cloning. However, it will result in very restricted applications. In this paper, we proposed a solution that is in fact a deterrence measure, namely leakage of sensitive information.
Broadcast encryption
Key revocation
The ability to revoke malicious users in a system has been seen as a desirable property for many cryptographic systems including credential systems and access control systems. Inspired by the work of Naor and Pinkas (2000) , an ABE scheme with key revocation was presented by Staddon et al. (2008) . However, the number of users that can be revoked in this scheme is fixed. Once this threshold is exceeded the system needs to be re-created. A more recent scheme by Lin et al. (2008) , allows for more efficient user revocation in an ABE scheme (both ciphertext-and key-policy schemes). In our work, simple and efficient user revocation comes as a side-effect introducing the token server.
Tokens
The use of token-controlled PKE was formalised by Baek et al. (2005) . Our situation is different, however, since we require a token to be specific to an individual user, whereas they allow multiple user use. Our tokens are also more embedded into the system as they depend on the user's decryption key.
3 Attribute-based encryption ABE schemes are an extension of identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes. We review some basic properties ABE schemes below.
Ciphertext-policy ABE schemes
In a CP-ABE scheme, a user's private key is determined by the set of attributes S that they possess. A ciphertext is created with a specific decryption policy W over the set of possible attributes. If a user's attributes satisfy the decryption policy, which we denote by S ∈ W, then the user's private key can decrypt the ciphertext.
Definition 3.1:
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme Δ is four-tuple of algorithms Δ = {Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt}. The algorithms are specified as follows:
• Setup(ℓ, [n]): Takes as input a security parameter ℓ and possibly the number of possible attributes n in the scheme. Outputs the system public key PK and the system private key, called the master key, MK.
• KeyGen(MK, PK, S): The TKG takes as input the master key MK, the system public key PK, and a user's attribute set S. Outputs a private key D to the user.
• Encrypt(PK, M, W): Takes as input the system public key PK, a plaintext message M, and a decryption policy W. Outputs the ciphertext C (in which the specification of the decryption policy W is included).
• Decrypt(PK, C, D): Takes as input the system public key PK, a ciphertext C and a user's decryption key D. Outputs a plaintext M if the user's attribute set satisfies the decryption policy W included in C.
Key-policy ABE schemes
In a KP-ABE scheme, the attributes are associated with the plaintext message instead of the user. The decryption policy in a KP-ABE scheme for each user is specific (perhaps not unique though) to each user and is embedded within each user's private key. The policy is set by the organisation running the ABE scheme and might, for example, assign decryption policies based on a user's role in the organisation. Each ciphertext is created with a set of attributes that describe the plaintext. If the attributes of the ciphertext satisfy the decryption policy of a given user, then that user is able to decrypt it. The entity encrypting a plaintext does not, in general, know who will be able to decrypt it.
A KP-ABE scheme Δ is also defined as a four-tuple of algorithms: Δ= {Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt}. The algorithms are very similar to that of a CP-ABE scheme [see Goyal et al. (2006) for example].
Token-based ABE schemes
In a token-based ABE scheme, denoted by tk-ABE, we bind some personal user information into the decryption process. Since private keys and ciphertexts in a typical ABE scheme are not bound to a user in the same way as in a typical PKE scheme, we introduce tokens and the token server to bind a user to decryption. In particular, in a tk-ABE scheme, in order for a user to decrypt any ciphertext, that user must first obtain a decryption token from the token server. This decryption token is specific to both the ciphertext that the user wishes to decrypt and to the user. In order for the issued token to be useful to the user (i.e., help the user decrypt the ciphertext), the user must provide some personal information. The idea is that if a user wishes to delegate their (cloned) private key, then their personal information is easily exposed, thus providing a deterrent for key delegation.
More formally, we define a ciphertext-policy tk-ABE scheme as follows: Definition 4.1: A ciphertext-policy token-based ABE (CP tk-ABE) scheme Δ is a five-tuple of algorithms Δ = {Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, GetToken, Encrypt}: The algorithms are specified as follows:
• KeyGen(MK, PK, ID, SID, π ID ): The TKG takes as input the master key MK, the system public key PK, and a user's information: identification ID, attributes • Encrypt(PK, M, W): Takes as input the system public key PK, a plaintext message M, and a decryption policy W. Outputs the ciphertext C which includes the decryption policy W and information needed to compute a ciphertext coupon.
The token server takes as input the user's identity ID, and a ciphertext coupon ˆI This definition for a ciphertext-policy tk-ABE scheme can easily be modified to define a key-policy tk-ABE scheme as well.
Security model
For a tk-ABE scheme to be secure, we require that the scheme be ciphertext indistinguishable, uncloneable and privacy-preserving. These security properties are formally defined below.
Ciphertext indistinguishability
We define security with respect to ciphertext indistinguishability with the following game, which we call the tk-ABE security game. The game is played between an adversary and a challenger and is given in Security Game 1 (page 7).
Since the adversary can simply guess α′ randomly and win the game with probability 1/2, the advantage of the adversary in this game is defined as Notice that ciphertext indistinguishability also implies collusion-resistance. That is, if a tk-ABE scheme Δ is ciphertext indistinguishable, then no collection of users in Δ can combine their keys to decrypt any ciphertext that any of the individual users could not have decrypted alone. This follows since the adversary in the tk-ABE security game is allowed to query for multiple private keys (and hence simulate the colluding users) before and after selecting the plaintexts for the challenge stage [as pointed out in Cheung and Newport (2007) ].
Security Game 1 tk-ABE security game
Initialisation:
The adversary chooses a decryption policy W that it wishes to be challenged upon.
System setup:
The challenger runs Setup(ℓ, n), for a given security parameter ℓ and number of attributes n, and gives the public parameters PK to the adversary.
Phase 1:
The adversary is allowed to make polynomially many adaptive queries consisting of (a) extracting existing keys: he requests to extract private decryption keys and personal information for any user whose attribute set S does not satisfy W. The adversary specifies ID and S of the user.
(b) creating new keys: he requests to create private decryption key for any user whose attribute set do not satisfy W. The adversary specifies ID, attribute set S and personal information π for the user.
(c) token requests: he requests a decryption token for any ciphertext and any user. The adversary specifies any ciphertext coupon Ĉ and any user
ID (and S, π if the user is new).
For any quantity that the adversary must specify in any request, the adversary may choose to allow the challenger to choose a random input instead.
Challenge:
The adversary submits two plaintexts M 0 and M 1 (M 0 ≠ M 1 ) taken from the plaintext domain. The challenger randomly picks α ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts M α with decryption policy W. The challenger gives the ciphertext C α to the adversary.
Phase 2:
The adversary may repeat Query Phase 1.
Guess:
The adversary outputs α′ ∈ {0, 1}, and wins if α = α′.
Uncloneability
The intuition of an uncloneable tk-ABE scheme is the following. Suppose Alice has private key D and personal information π. If Alice gives Bob a copy of her key D (a clone of D) then Bob can (efficiently) compute Alice's personal information π. Such a scheme is said to be uncloneable. We formalise this with the following definition. Here, let Π be the domain of valid users' personal information and let | Π |, the size of this space, be polynomial in ℓ (the size/security parameter of the scheme). In fact, we can strengthen this definition of uncloneability by relaxing the meaning of a cloned key. Letting W(S) denote the set of all policies satisfied by the set of attributes S, that is,
we define a partial cloned key as follows. Essentially, a partial cloned key, often simply called a partial key, is a key that when used in place of the original key in the Decrypt algorithm (with the correct personal information π) can decrypt a subset of the ciphertexts that the original private key can decrypt and is unable to decrypt any ciphertext that the original key is unable to decrypt with non-negligible probability. Thus, a partial cloned key corresponds to a new key with restricted decryption privileges relative to the original key. Notice that a cloned key is also a partial cloned key in which there is no restriction of decryption privileges.
While this notion of a partial cloned key is not completely general, we would like to point out that it does include decryption keys that are often generated when hierarchical key delegation is a feature of the scheme. For example, the delegated decryption keys in the work of Bethencourt et al. (2007) satisfy this definition of a partial cloned key.
With this definition for partial cloned keys, we have the following strengthened notion of uncloneability. Basically, this notion of uncloneability means that knowledge of any key derived from a user's key that can be used in place of the private key in the Decrypt algorithm is sufficient to compute that user's personal information.
Privacy-preserving
We formalise our notion of privacy as follows. Definition 4.6: Let Δ be a tk-ABE scheme with public key PK and master key MK. The scheme Δ is said to be privacy-preserving if given any user with identity ID and an attribute set S, their personal information π is statistically independent of ( , , ) , PK MK D where π is uniformly taken from Π (all the possible personal information) and D is the token information with respect to ID. Note that the distribution of ( , , ) PK MK D is over the randomness of the Setup and KeyGen algorithms, and the random variable π.
This notion of privacy-preserving essentially eliminates the concern that the trusted third party, who executes Setup and KeyGen, and token server cannot work together to obtain a user's personal information. We do, of course, need to assume that the trusted third party will not keep a copy of π, D and the randomness used during KeyGen when finishing KeyGen. This assumption is reasonable though (it is a trusted third party). If a trusted party is malicious from the beginning, it is hard to protect the system. In our notion, we require that π is statistically independent of ( , , ) . PK MK D One may doubt the possibility of this statistical independency as our ciphertext indistinguishability is computational. It is instructive to present the idea of our construction regarding this. In our scheme, the decryption key D is completely random (independent of PK, MK) with a randomness r. The token key is deterministic in (PK, MK, jointly forms a decryption key and this is why the decryption process needs an online server who keeps ˆ. D While the notion of privacy-preserving is introduced to guarantee against the exposure of a (well behaving) user's private information, it should be noted that in a token-based ABE scheme (that is uncloneable) there is additional pressure for a user keep their private decrypting key secret. If a user's private key is leaked (perhaps unintentionally or even unbeknownst to the user) then the user's private information can easily be obtained due to the uncloneability property. Therefore, it is essential that each user stores their private keys in a secure manner.
A concrete scheme
We now present a privacy-preserving uncloneable ciphertext-policy tk-ABE scheme. The scheme is based on Cheung and Newport's CP-ABE scheme and allows for decryption policies that consist of a single conjunction of attributes and negated attributes. The ciphertext contains a component for each attribute in the set of all possible attributes , N whether they appear in the conjunction or not. The components correspond to positive, negated or do not care attributes. Any attribute not appearing in the decryption policy is considered a do not care attribute, as the decryption policy does not depend on the user having or not having that attribute.
A decryption policy i I W i ∈ = Λ for some , I ⊂ N is a conjunction of positive and negative attributes. If i i = for a given attribute i, a user must possess attribute i to be able to decrypt the ciphertext. If , i i = ¬ a user must not possess attribute i to be able to decrypt it. The attributes i ∉ I correspond to the do not care attributes (i.e., the decryption policy does not care if a user has or does not have this attribute in order to be able to decrypt).
The algorithms in our tk-ABE scheme are defined as follows:
• Setup(ℓ, n): First the bilinear groups in which the scheme will operate are chosen: let G and 1 G be bilinear groups of prime order p, where p is an ℓ-bit prime, let g be a randomly chosen generator of the group , G and let and the system private key, called the master key, is MK = <y, t 1 , …, t 3n >. The system public key is made public and the master key is given to the TKG.
Note: We assume that elements in G and 1 G have binary representation with bitlength ℓ.
• 
where ˆs C g = is the ciphertext coupon.
The token server retrieves , ID D from its database of users and computes (and outputs) the ciphertext token Next, computing the product 
Efficiency
The overall computational complexity (of all entities combined) is essentially the same as in the CN scheme. The differences include:
• In the KeyGen algorithm, the TKG has one additional division for each user when computing the exponent for ˆ. D In the KeyGen algorithm, In particular, the TKG needs to compute (y -r) / π in our scheme as opposed to simply (y -r) in the CN scheme.
• In the Decrypt algorithm, each user must perform one additional exponentiation when unmasking T for each decryption.
• The TS needs to compute one pairing operation for each GetToken request.
TKG needs to compute O(n) exponentiations for each user added to the scheme (in the KeyGen algorithm). Each user needs to compute O(n) pairing operations and O(n) multiplications to decrypt a single ciphertext, and the TS needs to compute one paring operation for each GetToken request. Encryption of a plaintext requires O(n) exponentiations.
Even though the TS only needs to compute one pairing operation per GetToken request, the number of such requests may be very large. In order to lessen the load of the TS, multiple token servers can be used and each user is assigned to one of them.
There is also a significant communication complexity in our tk-ABE scheme, since each user must request a token from the TS each time they wish to decrypt a ciphertext. Again, adding multiple token servers will distribute this cost.
When the number of attributes n is large, the CN scheme (and hence this scheme) is very inefficient as decryption needs O(n) pairing operations and exponentiations, and both the ciphertext and private keys have O(n) size. In this situation, the CP-ABE scheme by Bethencourt et al. (2007) is much more efficient. We show how this scheme can be tokenised (i.e., turned into a tk-ABE scheme) in Section 6.
User revocation
The main intention of introducing a token server to ABE schemes was to create uncloneable schemes. A side effect of this (introduction of TS) is that revoking a user's decryption privileges in a tk-ABE scheme is trivial. Since a user needs a decryption token in order to decrypt any ciphertext (using their private key), we can simply remove the user's entry in the token server's database. Clearly, a policy for user revocation must be enforced (i.e., a policy for who can and cannot revoke users). By introducing more data into the TS's database of users, more complex policies can also be incorporated into tk-ABE schemes also. For example, user's might be put on 'probation' for a certain period of time in which they are not allowed to be issued decryption tokens. Or perhaps 'premium users' in a system are allowed to decrypt content before non-premium users.
A level of trust, however, must be endowed on the TS if revocation is to be allowed. While a corrupt (or corrupted) TS cannot reveal any user's private information (if the scheme is privacy-preserving), it can effectively remove decryption privileges for any user in the system and it can also provide decryption privileges to any revoked user if it wishes.
Security
We now show that our scheme satisfies the three desired security properties for a tk-ABE scheme. To prove ciphertext indistinguishability, we reduce the problem to another (believed) hard problem: the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem. In particular, we rely on the following assumption. z Z e g g = With this, we can state our first security result. The advantage in solving the DBDH problem is the probability of success minus 1/2 (since one can always guess the correct answer with probability 1/2).
Theorem 5.1: Our scheme is secure against CPA in the selective ID model, provided that the DBDH assumption holds.
Proof: Our proof is modified from Cheung and Newport (2007) . Let A denote an adversary who can win the tk-ABE security game with non-negligible advantage .
ε We construct a simulator SIM that uses A to help it solve the DBDH problem with non-negligible advantage / 2. ε This is a contradiction if the DBDH assumption holds, so we can conclude that such an A cannot exist.
Suppose that SIM is given a DBDH challenge , , , , , 
The public parameters where t i = log g T i is the exponent of T i with base g, for each i. Some are known to SIM and some are not (i.e., the t i for the T i created with B are unknown).
Phase 1: To help SIM reply to 's
A queries, we show how SIM can generate private keys and token information for users with attribute sets S * that do not satisfy the challenge decryption policy W. The algorithm NewUser takes as input a user's ID * , attribute set S * and personal information π * and outputs a valid private key D and token information D for that user.
• NewUser(ID * , S * , π * ): Since S * does not imply the decryption capability of I (by definition of security model), there must exist a j ∈ I such that either j ∈ S * and j j = ¬ in I, or j ∉ S * and j j = in I. SIM chooses such a j. Without loss of generality, assume j ∉ S * and j j = in I (i.e., the user does not have attribute j).
For every , i ∈ N SIM randomly chooses . For users with attribute sets that satisfy the challenge decryption policy W, the adversary is only allowed to query for decryption tokens. To generate token information for such users, SIM uses the following helper function NewToken, defined as: , , , ..., n p r r r r ′ ∈ Z and sets r 1 = ab + r′ 1 (unknown) and r = r 1 + ⋅⋅⋅ r n (unknown). Thus, the distribution of the r i are the same here as they are in Decrypt. Therefore, the D i and F i are correctly (implicitly) defined. The token information for user ID is then computed as Proof: Let Δ be the ciphertext-policy tk-ABE scheme with public key PK. Let ID be the user in Δ with private key D and personal information π, for which we have the partial cloned key . D D ′ ≺ Let W′ be a policy in W(S) for which D′ can be used to decrypt ciphertexts. We pick a random M and encrypt it under W′ to get a ciphertext C. Now since D′ can be used to decrypt C, we know that the partial cloned key must contain at least one of {D i , F i } for each i (otherwise, if both are missing the secret sharing scheme will not have enough shares to reconstruct the secret sr in the exponent and the product E be a random element in the group). Thus, we can compute ( , ) .
sr E e g g = We also query TS to get T. Recall that the plaintext (in the Decrypt algorithm) is computed by ( , ) . ( Now we show that our scheme is privacy-preserving. It essentially means that a user's personal information will, information theoretically, remain private even if a token server and the TKG work together. Of course, this requires that this TKG will be honest in the key generation stage and become corrupted only later. Otherwise, the TKG can always keep a copy of π when computing the token key ˆ.
D
The key idea for the privacy of π in our scheme is that D is uniformly chosen random over the randomness of (r 1 , ⋅⋅⋅, r n ), even if given (PK, MK). Note that D is deterministic in π and (MK, PK, D). However, due to the randomness of r = r 1 + ⋅⋅⋅ + r n , D will be independent of (π, PK, MK) (i.e., when D is not given). π is taken uniformly from Π (our result also holds for the case this distribution is not uniform) and hence independent of (PK, MK). Thus, the three random variables ˆ, , ( , ) D PK MK π are jointly independent. Details follow.
Theorem 5.3: Our scheme is privacy-preserving.
Proof: We first fix a user's identification ID and attribute set S. Their personal information π is uniformly distributed over Π (Note: our proof also holds for the case the distribution is not uniform). Assume PK, MK, the user's private key D, and the token information D are computed according to the specification of Setup and KeyGen. The distribution of ( , , , ) PK MK D D is over the randomness of Setup, KeyGen and variable π. We need to show that π is statistically independent of ( , , ) . PK MK D Recall that with the specification where r = r 0 . Since r is uniformly random, we have r = r 0 with probability 1 / p, which is identical when π 0 goes over Π. Hence, π is independent of ( , , ) .
MK PK D
A second concrete scheme
The privacy-preserving uncloneable tk-ABE scheme in Section 5 is only suitable when the total number of attributes, n, is relatively small. This follows since the ciphertext size, private key size, and the complexity of both decryption and encryption are all linear in the total number of attributes.
In this section, we present a second privacy-preserving uncloneable tk-ABE scheme that is more suitable when the total number of attributes is large. The scheme is based on the CP-ABE scheme of Bethencourt et al. (2007) . Here, the decryption policy can be any formula that can be realised by combinations of AND, OR and threshold gates with attributes as inputs. The decryption policy W is realised by a tree access structure , T where each internal node represents a single AND, OR or threshold gate, and leaf nodes correspond to the input attributes. In this scheme, decryption uses Lagrange interpolation in the exponents of group elements (compared to the linear secret sharing of the previous scheme). Following Bethencourt et al. (2007) , and Sahai and Waters (2005) , we write the Lagrange coefficient as
p S ⊂ Z For more details, we refer the reader to Bethencourt et al. (2007) , and Sahai and Waters (2005) . The algorithms that define this scheme are given below.
• Setup(ℓ): First the bilinear groups in which the scheme will operate are chosen: let G and 1 G be bilinear groups of prime order p (where p is an ℓ-bit prime), let g be a randomly chosen generator of , G and let PK is made public and MK is given to the TKG.
• KeyGen(MK, PK, ID, S, π): To generate a private decryption key for a user with identification ID, attributes S and personal information π, the TKG does the following: Choose a random , p r ∈ Z and for each attribute j ∈ S, choose a random . and sends , ID D to the token server.
• Encrypt(MK, M, W): To encrypt a plaintext message 1 M ∈ G with decryption policy W, described by the tree access structure , T the user does the following. A polynomial q x is chosen for each node x (including the leaves) in the tree .
T These polynomials are chosen in the following way in a top-down manner, starting from the root node r. For each node x in the tree, set the degree d x of the polynomial q x to be one less than the threshold value k x of that node, that is, d x = k x -1. Starting with the root node r the algorithm chooses a random p s ∈ Z and sets q r (0) = s. Then, it chooses d r other points of the polynomial q r randomly to define it completely. For any other node x, it sets q x (0) = q parent (x)(index(x)) and chooses d x other points randomly to completely define q x . Letting L be the set of leaf nodes in , T the ciphertext is constructed as
The token server retrieves , ID D from its database of users and computes (and outputs) the ciphertext token 
which is associated with a set S of attributes, and a node x from .
T If the node x is a leaf node then we let i = att(x) and have the base case as follows: 
DECRY PT NODE
For the recursive case of the algorithm, when the node x is a non-leaf node, the algorithm DecryptNode(C, D, x) proceeds as follows: for all nodes z that are children of x, it calls DecryptNode(C, D, z) and stores the output as F z . Let S x be an arbitrary k x -sized set of child nodes z such that F z ≠ ⊥. If no such set exists then the node was not satisfied and the function returns ⊥. Otherwise, compute and return
( , ) (from polynomial interpolation). 
Efficiency
The space and computation complexity of this scheme, just as with the previous, is essentially the same as the scheme that is based on [i.e., Bethencourt et al.'s (2007) scheme]. In comparison to the previous tk-ABE scheme, notice that the size of the ciphertext is now linear in the number of inputs to the formula describing the decryption formula instead of linear in the total number of attributes. The ciphertext must also, however, contain the access tree . T A user's private key is now linear in the number of attributes that they possess instead of linear in the total number of attributes, and the computational costs are linear in the size of the access tree T instead of linear in the total number of attributes.
Key revocation
Just as with the previous scheme, revoking a user from the scheme is made trivial by simply refusing to issue decryption tokens to that particular user.
Security
The scheme in this section satisfies all of the three security requirements that we desire for a tk-ABE scheme: ciphertext indistinguishability, uncloneability and privacy-preserving.
The ciphertext indistinguishability of the scheme follows from Bethencourt et al.'s scheme. The security model is slightly different from the previous scheme though. Here, the security game allows the adversary to choose the decryption policy in which it will be challenged after the Phase 1 queries, so we are no longer in the selective-ID model. We will call this the non-selective-ID model. While this allows for a more powerful adversary, the underlying assumption that the security is reduced to is weaker. Here, security is based on the generic bilinear group model. In this model, an adversary can be shown to have advantage O(q 2 / p) in the CP-ABE game (choosing W after Phase 1), where q is the number of group elements received from all queries. We omit the proof since it easily follows from the security proof of the original (non-token-based) scheme, see Bethencourt et al. (2007) , and does not contribute any new proof techniques or provide any new insights.
The uncloneability and privacy-preserving properties of the scheme can be shown in a similar way as the tk-ABE scheme in Section 5. As with the ciphertext indistinguishability property, we omit these proofs since they are easily constructed and do not contribute to the exposition.
Non-interactive schemes
In some scenarios, a major drawback to token-based ABE schemes is the communication complexity involved in the system. In the tk-ABE schemes presented above, each time a user wants to decrypt a (new) ciphertext they must first request and receive a decryption token. Since the TS must perform some non-trivial computation before issuing a decryption token, if many requests are received at the same time (which may occur soon after a ciphertext is made available) the system might be rather slow at times. While using several token servers might alleviate most of this congestion, using a non-interactive system would be very desirable in some circumstances.
In a non-interactive (privacy-preserving uncloneable) ABE scheme, we can bind a user's personal information directly into that user's private key. We require that this personal information which is embedded into the private key must be used (unchanged) to decrypt every ciphertext that the user is allowed to decrypt. We also require that their private information must be feasibly extracted given the private decryption key.
Just as with the token-based schemes described above, we focus on ciphertext-policy ABE schemes. A non-interactive (privacy-preserving uncloneable) CP-ABE scheme follows the same definition as a CP-ABE scheme (recall Definition 3.1). Thus, such a scheme is comprised of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt.
Security model
We define the three security properties needed for a uncloneable CP-ABE scheme in the non-interactive model.
As with other CP-ABE schemes, we define security with respect to ciphertext indistinguishability using a game between an adversary A and a challenger .
C The game is given below in Security Game 2.
Security Game 2 Non-interactive uncloneable CP-ABE
Initialisation:
The adversary chooses a valid decryption policy W to be challenged upon.
System setup:
The Challenger runs Setup(ℓ, n) and gives PK to the adversary.
Phase 1:
The adversary can adaptively make polynomially many private key requests for any user with any attribute set S ∉ W. In these requests, either the adversary provides the personal information π for the private key request, or the challenger randomly chooses π ∈ Π for the new key. 
Phase 2:
The adversary repeats Phase 1.
Guess:
The adversary guesses μ′ ∈ [0, 1] and wins if μ′ = μ.
Since the adversary can simply guess correctly with probability 1/2, the advantage of the adversary in the game is defined as
A CP-ABE scheme is said to be secure against CPA attacks in the selective ID model if no polynomial time adversary has non-negligible advantage in the above game.
The intuition of uncloneability for a non-interactive ABE scheme is the same as for tk-ABE except that we do not require oracle access to the token server here. Hence, uncloneability, strong uncloneability can be defined in a similar manner as before (see Section 4.1) by simply omitting the token server access. For example, using the same definition for partial cloned keys (Definition 4.4), we define strong uncloneability as follows. Again, Π is the domain of users' personal information and | Π | is the size of this domain.
Privacy-preserving for non-interactive schemes is even simpler than in the interactive schemes. Recall that in the interactive schemes, the privacy-preserving property requires that a user's personal information π be independent of ( , , ) , PK MK D where PK, MK are the public and master key, and D is the token information. In the non-interactive case, however, the token server has been removed. Hence, the privacy-preserving property degenerates to simply require that π be independent of (PK, MK). However, the system public key and master key are sampled by the Setup algorithm and hence are independent of PK and MK: So the privacy-preserving property holds automatically and we will not consider it further in this setting.
The main difficulties in constructing a non-interactive ABE scheme are how to force a decryptor to use both π and D in order to decrypt a ciphertext and how to embed π into D such that when D is leaked, π will be leaked with a reasonable effort.
Key revocation
It should be noted that key revocation in a non-interactive privacy-preserving uncloneable ABE scheme is not a trivial task as it was with token-based ABE schemes. Here, either the system has to be reset (constructing a new public key and issuing new decrypting keys to valid users) or some other mechanism must be incorporated into the scheme. Generally, this is a costly operation.
Concrete scheme
In this section, we present a concrete non-interactive privacy-preserving uncloneable ABE scheme. The scheme is based on the CP-ABE scheme of Cheung and Newport (2007) . Unlike in the token-based ABE scenario, however, in which the ideas can be applied to different pre-existing ABE schemes to construct a tk-ABE scheme, the non-interactive instantiation seems to be specific to Cheung and Newport's scheme. The idea behind the transformation (from ABE to non-interactive privacy-preserving uncloneable ABE) does not seem applicable to any of the other known ABE schemes. This is because in the other schemes, typically, a user can re-randomise their secret key by simply multiplying all of the components in their private key by some random number. In our scheme, however, we require that a user's personal information explicitly appear in the private key. Any re-randomisation destroys this and so all of the other schemes cannot be (directly) transformed. We now propose a CP-ABE scheme that is (strongly) uncloneable without the use of decryption tokens. This is achieved by adding a single dummy attribute that each entity in the system possesses and is needed for decryption of any ciphertext. Essentially, all valid decryption policies for any ciphertext implicitly requires the user to have this attribute. In the scheme, this attribute (we will denote it as the zeroth attribute i 0 ) for a given user will be deterministically determined by that user's personal information π. If a user distributes a clone of this key (or a partial clone that is able to decrypt) then the user must reveal this zeroth attribute and hence reveal their personal information. Thus, the uncloneability property comes from a user not wishing to divulge their personal information.
Our construction is based on the CP-ABE scheme of Cheung and Newport (2007) . In the following, let Π be the space of valid personal information. The four algorithms in the scheme are given below.
• Setup(ℓ, n): First the bilinear groups in which the scheme will operate are chosen: let G and 1 G be bilinear groups of prime order p (where p is an ℓ-bit prime), let g be a randomly chosen generator of , G and let and the system private key, called the master key, is MK = <y, t 0 , t 1 , …, t 3n >. The system public key is made public and the master key is given to the trusted key generator TKG.
Note: This is the same as in our tk-ABE Setup algorithm except for the addition of t 0 and T 0 .
• KeyGen ( 
. , 
. 
Efficiency
The complexity of our non-interactive ABE scheme is essentially the same as the complexity of the CN scheme, except that the addition of the zeroth attribute adds one more operation to each algorithm in the scheme as follows:
• Setup requires on additional exponentiation (to • Decrypt requires one addition pairing operation (for E 0 ) and one addition multiplication (for the product of the E i ).
The space requirements are all increased by 1 in the interactive-scheme to account for the zeroth attribute. In general, the space and computational complexities are still O(n) for this scheme.
Security of the non-interactive scheme
Our non-interactive ABE scheme presented above satisfies the three security properties outlined above: ciphertext indistinguishability, uncloneability, and privacy-preserving. That is, the scheme is a non-interactive privacy-preserving uncloneable ABE scheme. The ciphertext indistinguishability follows from Cheung and Newport's (2007) scheme, while the other properties follow closely with the tk-ABE scheme presented in Section 5.
Theorem 7.1: Our scheme is secure against CPA in the selective ID model provided that the DBDH problem assumption holds.
Proof: Our proof is modification of the original scheme from Cheung and Newport (2007) . Let A denote an adversary who can win the security game define above with non-negligible advantage .
Suppose SIM is given a DBDH challenge , , , , , 
The system public parameters 
D D
′ ≺ Let W′ be a policy in W(S) for which D′ can be used to decrypt ciphertexts. We pick a random M and encrypt it under W′ to get a ciphertext C. Since D′ can be used to decrypt C, the partial cloned key must contain at least one of {D i , F i } for each . i ∈ N Hence, we can compute E i for all . i ∈ N Recall that the plaintext (in the Decrypt algorithm) is computed by As mentioned above, the privacy-preserving property automatically holds for the non-interactive schemes. (This is because a user's personal information π is independent of (PK, MK) generically.)
Colluding users
While this non-interactive scheme satisfies the three security properties, we observe that users in the system (with valid private keys) that have the same attribute set can combine their keys by simply multiplying their keys together (component-wise multiplication) to create a new valid key corresponding to the same attribute set. The zeroth attribute of this new key corresponds to the product of the colluding user's personal information. Thus, the colluding users expose their personal information to each other. Without knowledge of one of the user's personal information though, the new key does not reveal anything about the colluding users' personal information. Thus, this scheme is weaker than the tk-ABE schemes that are presented earlier.
Conclusions
ABE schemes provide an elegant method of controlling access to information. However, we have described a security weakness in the current definition of ABE systems that makes all known ABE systems what we call 'delegatable'. That is, the ABE schemes allow users in the system to clone their keys or to construct new keys that bypass the role of the system TKG. We have introduced a new type of ABE scheme, token-based ABE, which provides a disincentive for users to misuse their key information (key cloning in particular) by linking any leakage of their ABE private key to the complete loss of some personal information that the user wants to protect. We have proposed a security model for tk-ABE by motivating and formalising three security properties, ciphertext indistinguishability, uncloneability and privacypreserving, and presented a tk-ABE scheme. We have proved the security of this scheme in the proposed model. We have also given a second construction in Section 6 that provides higher efficiency and is based on the scheme of Bethencourt et al. (2007) .
In addition to the tk-ABE schemes that we presented in this work, we also presented a non-interactive ABE scheme. While this scheme has the advantage (over tk-ABE schemes) that it does not require a token server, the ideas used in constructing our scheme from pre-existing schemes only seem to applicable the CN scheme at the current time. Also, our non-interactive scheme allows for users in the system to combine decryption keys to create a new decryption key, which is not a desirable property.
The ideas presented in this work open many new interesting avenues for future work, some of which are outlined below.
First, at a very fundamental level, is the issue of providing secure support for delegation in ABE systems. The ability to delegate keys may be required in some systems (hierarchical schemes for example). However, in a secure system with key delegation, a delegation policy must be well defined in advance and enforced by the system. All current ABE systems implicitly support an open delegation policy in the sense that they allow a user to clone their key, or give away part of their keys and their associated decryption power. Our approach may be seen as a closed approach in the sense that only the TKG can allocate keys and register new users and any mis-use of ABE keys will endanger an individual's personal information. A challenging research direction is to allow defining delegation policies for users and ensuring that it is enforced.
Second, the methods that we use can easily be extended/modified to any of the other known ABE schemes (both ciphertext-policy and key-policy) to create a tk-ABE scheme. An open problem is to construct a tk-ABE scheme that is not based on an existing ABE scheme using new techniques.
Third, our solution introduces a token server that issues tokens that are specific to a user requesting them and is necessary for decryption of a ciphertext. While we have presented a non-interactive scheme, it remains an open question if a non-interactive ABE scheme can be constructed using other known ABE schemes as a base (see Section 7.3). And, it remains an open question if a non-interactive scheme can be constructed that prevents users from combining keys to create new valid decryption keys.
Fourth, in a tk-ABE scheme, the deterrence for key cloning is obtained by adding the token server (and decryption tokens). The computational load on the token server can be quite high if many users request decryption tokens. One possible research direction to address this is to find a method in which the communication and computational overhead for issuing a token by the TS is very small, like in the token-controlled PKE of Baek et al. (2005) . In this way, a tk-ABE scheme would have minimal TS costs.
Finally, the schemes we present only offer security against key delegation of cloned keys. An open (and important) problem is to create uncloneable schemes for any kind of key delegation (including pseudo-keys and keys created by colluding users).
